UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
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KSNEIA SHNYRA et al.,	
Plaintiffs,	
v.	19 Civ. 2420 (GHW
STATE STREET BANK and TRUST	
COMPANY, INC.,	Teleconference
Defendants.	refeconference
x	
Λ	New York, N.Y. May 21, 2020
	1:00 p.m.
Before:	
HON. GREGORY	H. WOODS,
	District Judge
APPEARAN	JCES
LUMEN LAW	
Attorney for Plaintiffs	
BY: MIKHAIL RATNER	
BY: MIKHAIL RATNER  NIXON PEABODY  Attorneys for Defendants	
BY: MIKHAIL RATNER NIXON PEABODY	
BY: MIKHAIL RATNER  NIXON PEABODY  Attorneys for Defendants  BY: DAVID S. ROSENTHAL	
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BY: MIKHAIL RATNER  NIXON PEABODY  Attorneys for Defendants  BY: DAVID S. ROSENTHAL	

(Pause)

THE COURT: This is Judge Woods. I apologize for starting late. Let me say a few words of introduction at the outset. Give me a moment, please.

THE COURT: Good. So first a few words about the correct protocol. First, please state your names each time that you speak during the course of this conference. Do that regardless of whether or not you've spoken it previously. Second, please keep your phones on mute at all times when you're not speaking that's to keep us from hearing unnecessary background noise. So please keep your phones on mute. Third, I'm asking the court reporter to let us know if she has any difficulty in hearing or understanding anything that any of us say here today. So please don't be surprised if she speaks up. If she does, please do what she asks so that we can keep a clear record.

So with that, who do I have on the line for plaintiff?

MR. RATNER: Your Honor, Mikhail Ratner, for
plaintiffs.

If you need me to spell my first and last name, it's M-i-k --

THE COURT: It's not necessary.

Who do I have on the line for defendants?

MR. TAUSTER: Good afternoon, your Honor.

You have David Tauster. And I believe you also have

David Rosenthal from Nixon Peabody.

MR. ROSENTHAL: That's right. This is David Rosenthal. I am here.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you.

So first we're here for an initial pretrial conference. The agenda for the conference is straightforward. First I'm going to give you the opportunity to let me know if there are any facts or legal issues that you'd like to highlight for me. Second, we're going to discuss the process that we're going to be using to litigate the case going forward. So that portion of the conference I expect to look to the parties' proposed case management plan and scheduling order to provide the framework for our conversation. And I hope to discuss what, if anything, I can do to facilitate an amicable resolution of the case. So with that agenda at hand, let me turn first to counsel for plaintiffs.

What would you like to tell me about the case?

MR. RATNER: Your Honor, I think -- I hesitate to say anything more than what's written in the complaint and your Honor's decision on the motion to dismiss exhibited close to familiarity with the facts and circumstances of this case.

If the Court would like, I can refresh the recollection of everybody.

But it's an unusual case in the sense of my client -the entire department that housed my client was disbanded to

cover up a wrongful termination. And that, in essence, is the
central elastic of this case: State Street disbanded suddenly
a 17-person department. We allege that a good chunk of the
folks, if not all of them, were subsequently offered jobs.
Some of them actually were retained back; my three clients were
the only ones who weren't. And it followed on the hills of a
complaint made by the central player in this case, Dr. Ksenia
Shnyhra, and of gender discrimination. And subsequently, her
close colleague and another managing director of the unit,
Alexander Reyngold, basically confirmed her complaint, stood up
with her, and both were terminated. And a third person and
my client Kenneth Walker, was also terminated and not
offered a job back based on the fact that he was over 40. That
is, in essence, what we have here, your Honor.

I have not seen anything from defendant by way of, you know, good business reason for terminating an entire department like that. In fact, up until the very — pretty much a couple months until the department was disbanded, my clients, especially Dr. Shnyra and Mr. Reyngold, were bandied about as sort of paragons of success and commitment to the State Street defendant's business model. And all of a sudden, this aboutface that happened a couple months later, it was clearly tied to, you know, the events that precipitated the complaints by Dr. Shnyra.

So that's, in a nutshell, what this case is about,

your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Let me just ask briefly about one issue raised in the letter submitted by the parties, which relates to the focus of your claims. Counsel for defendant points to the plaintiffs' failure to apply for the newly opened positions and points to well-supported jurisprudence that one must apply for a job in order to be — in order to state a claim for having been denied that job.

Can you comment on that, and in particular on whether that is the focus of your claims here; in other words, the failure to hire?

MR. RATNER: Well, it's a combination of the factors that the entire department was disbanded suddenly and most of the folks were subsequently rehired — or so we allege at least. My clients have some evidence to that effect already. My clients were actively discouraged — we'll present evidence — from doing anything in terms of trying to reinstate themselves within State Street. And I can't imagine there being anything that could possibly — would prompt them to actively pursue employment with State Street after what had happened just, you know, weeks before the entire department was disbanded. My client, Dr. Shnyra, was so denigrated and so discouraged that she suffered, you know, an anaphylactic shock and was hospitalized. And there were other health issues that

followed at or around the time that we're talking about.

But they did make an attempt to try to -- in emails themselves, I may add, your Honor -- that's something that we'll present in discovery. In the emails themselves, they repeatedly say, you know, We want to resolve this issue, we want to be good citizens to State Street. And after they were let go, the communication chain was cut immediately. So there really isn't anything by way of emails, I think, subsequent to that. The job postings were internal to State Street, and it actually didn't go outside of its own internal network to place these people back into positions that they pretty much occupied during the time that they were still with the department that was sacked.

So, yes, I understand the defendant's point that you have to apply for a job in order for you to claim that you were denied it, but in this case, I think what's happened is that the entire department was sacked, and then everybody was kind of quietly were placed — were offered positions. My clients tried to do something about it even before the department was sacked, but, you know, subsequent to that, they didn't really aggressively pursue an employment opportunity in a way that drove them to the position that they find themselves right now.

THE COURT: Thank you. That's helpful.

Of course, the parties' positions will evolve as you seek it for the course of discovery in this case. At this

point, I understand that plaintiffs are not principally
pursuing this as a failure-to-hire claim but, rather, that the
rehiring allegations are in support of the contentions that the
termination of them was pretextual because other people were
hired back. Good.

Anything else that you'd like to tell me, could counsel for plaintiffs, before I turn to counsel for defendant?

MR. RATNER: I just -- I think, your Honor, you'll find in this case that -- especially with Dr. Shnyra -- that it's an example of where, you know, discrimination at the workplace is really a public health issue as much as it is also a week-old nightmare. And she has suffered tremendously because of what has happened to her during the time that we're talking about. Other than that -- and that's why we're looking to present expert testimony from doctors, or at least in some form, go through discovery on this issue. There are some serious health issues that we have just -- I'm reluctant to talk about them right now at this point, but that will be whetted out through discovery.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you. Let me turn to counsel for defendant.

What would you like to tell me about the case?

MR. TAUSTER: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is

David Tauster, Nixon Peabody.

I think, his description that this is a -- I think he

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said -- unique or odd case is apt, because we do think it is very odd and very unique that plaintiffs believe that they can support a discrimination claim where an entire department of individuals -- old and young, male and female, all races, etc. -- were discharged.

The plaintiffs were a part of State Street's group known as Enterprise Risk Advisory Services. They performed the kind of quantitative risk modeling for businesses that I could never hope to understand, but which is apparently somewhat commonplace. State Street at one point did look at this as a, you know, useful part of this operation. By the same token, however, all the risk modeling performed by this unit known as, ERAS, was all performed internally. I think they might have done one external project the entire time they existed. So realistically, this was not an revenue-generating sector, but rather, just an in-house service. Over time, State Street realized that it was not realizing the type of gains from having the type of services inhouse that it could have realized from farming them out to similar companies and, therefore, elected to eliminate the ERAS group.

Plaintiff's allegations about discrimination
harassment before that happened, those are all baseless. You
know, at the end of the day -- you know, plaintiffs' counsel
has spoken at length about Dr. Shnyra -- Ksenia Shnyra,
plaintiff here -- and to a certain degree Dr. Shnyra, went out

of her way to be aggressive and abrasive to her colleagues, but
needless to say, was never subjected to any form of
discrimination, harassment, or anything of the sort during her
employment. And frankly with respect to Plaintiffs Walker and
Reyngold, their claims are completely absurd here. There's
nothing really to support that Plaintiff Reyngold actively
supported any complaints that were made by Dr. Shnyra. To the
contrary, Reyngold complained, frankly, you know, that they
were not protected activity; they were Reyngold complaining to
the supervisor about why he wasn't making more money and being
promoted. But needless to say, again, he was eliminated as a
part of the universal reduction and not due to any complaints
or anything of that sort. And Plaintiff Walker, frankly, does
not allege that he made any complaints. He was hired into
ERAS, he was discharged, and it's as simply as that. There's
really nothing to his claim other than that he was hired when
he was over 40, and he was fired when he was over 40.

So needless to say, State Street believes it has a very defensible position in this litigation. And while we understand that the Court believed that plaintiff stated a claim, State Street is very confident that it will prevail in this litigation whether at summary judgment or at trial.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you very much.

So let's talk about discovery here. I've reviewed the parties' proposed case management plan and scheduling order.

I'd like to hear from the parties about your expectations for discovery here. I'm interested in information about the kind of issues that will inform my assessment of the deadlines that the parties have proposed. That's particularly the case here where the parties have suggested a relatively extended discovery schedule. So I'd just like to make sure that I understand what it is that you expect to be doing and how it is that you expect to complete that work within the time frame that you have proposed. So let me begin first with counsel for plaintiffs.

Counsel, what can you tell me about your expectations for discovery here?

MR. RATNER: Well, your Honor, I think we'll be seeking documents related to my client's employment at State Street, as well as any information related to ERAS department group, leading up to its disbandment and subsequent. So kind of a short window in which we'll be asking for documents that are beyond sort of the personnel files.

And then we plan, on the basis of the documents that we do receive, to depose several members of -- you know, supervisors to the extent that they still obviously are under State Street control. And then if necessary, we will, you know, look to subpoen them otherwise for sort of instrumental in the misconduct that we're talking about here; some of them named already in the complaint. And that majority in the

complaint already as the officers and directors who were direct supervisors who were maybe ERAS, but still played an integral part in this case. And we will be seeking to present evidence of damages to my clients as well.

The other thing — the elephant in the room, your Honor, if I may say so — is the fact that we're going through these extraordinary times. I am not against — obviously documents exchange will take place electronically. I can't imagine — even if it's an enormous amount of data and documents, we'll figure out how to exchange things electronically, because right now I don't have access to my office, for example, and I'm not sure when that's going to change. And I suggest we address these issues, as they've done now, and not worry about what's happening a month or two from now.

And the other thing is depositions and litigation practice. I have scheduled several depositions. I haven't taken them over the Zoom, but, you know, I understand that that's something that's, you know, going to be common practice until at least the time that we can safely assemble and whatnot. And especially because some of the parties -- not parties, pardon me -- witnesses are located in Boston, it may be easier for us to do it this way. But I will, of course, look to the Court for guidance as to ultimately what's going to happen here.

So	that's	what	my	view	of	the	case	is	and	procedure.
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Let me ask briefly, counsel for plaintiff, about your expectations for expert discovery here. You've mentioned, for example, serious medical consequences of the alleged conduct by defendant here.

What can you say about your expectations for expert discovery?

MR. RATNER: I think what I'm looking to do is to present evidence of how the stress of what Dr. Shnyra was going through had caused — had contributed significantly seriously to several physical conditions that she had suffered from, health issues. And, you know, there's no question that she had them and she has them, and they came about around the time — she didn't have anything prior to that. So I will tie in the timeline with the diagnosis and the sort of subsequent development of these conditions, you know, to the issue of to what extent the enormous stress had contributed to development of these conditions.

THE COURT: Thank you. Good. I appreciate that. Thank you.

Counsel for plaintiffs, have the parties discussed ESI and, in particular, issues such as search terms and custodians?

MR. RATNER: No, your Honor, we have not discussed these as of yet.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you.

Let me turn to counsel for defendant.

Counsel, what can you tell me about your expectations for discovery here?

MR. TAUSTER: Thank you, your Honor. This is David
Tauster from Nixon Peabody.

Plaintiff, I think accurately summarized some of the challenges that we expect to face in discovery here. Again, I don't need to remind everyone that we're dealing with a global pandemic. And, you know, as plaintiff's counsel noted, we have the defendant primarily headquartered in Boston, plaintiffs headquartered in New York.

What I can see being some of the challenges here warranting a bit longer discovery schedule, and even — taking a step back here, I think it's worth noting that it's somewhat obvious that this is a very long and dense complaint. I know plaintiff indicated that he's only focused on, you know, immediately proceeding the discharges and thereafter, but there are allegations in this complaint that go back some time in terms particularly of the disparate treatment allegations and things of that sort.

So certainly document collection is going -- you know, in and of itself would have been a challenge. And that's before factoring in that this collection will have to have been completely remotely. So we are going to have to deal with

that.

We suspect that there may be some discovery — considerable discovery that plaintiffs will be seeking that we will be resisting. As we brief the Court in our motion to dismiss, we believe that there are multiple allegations in this complaint that should have been stricken. We understand the Court disagrees, but by the same token, we will likely resist discovery, you know, to the extent that plaintiffs intend to seek discovery relating to those issues, completely unrelated claims of race discrimination, things of that sort. So we can see some challenges arising just as we get through the exchange of written discovery, processing of documents, etc., and then ultimately culminating in depositions.

Obviously, as plaintiff's counsel pointed out, remote depositions are going to become an increasing reality in the legal practice and, who knows, they may take over and become the dominant means of taking depositions. By the same token, I will say that building in extra time into the schedule, such as the parties can get to the poll when they're taking depositions, it is my hope — and maybe I'm just way too optimistic, but perhaps we might be able to take the plaintiffs' deposition in person just because I find that helps in terms of assessing demeanor and things of that sort.

So ultimately, even if there was not a pandemic, I think that this might be the type of somewhat complex case that

would warrant more time to complete discovery. But certainly, given the current global circumstances, we would appreciate the Court so ordering of the case management plan so we can have the time we need rather than having to come running back to the Court and ask for more time.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

So first, counsel, thank you for your comments.

Second, I've reviewed the proposed deadlines in the proposed case management plan and the scheduling order in light of your comments. And I believe that, with one small exception, the deadlines that the parties have proposed are acceptable. They are reasonable and provide sufficient time for the parties to complete whatever necessary to litigate this case.

Let me begin with the first small exception. That relates to paragraph 7F. I believe that the date needs to be advanced to October 18, just one day from the current deadline, in order to give you the full 30 days to respond to requests to admit within the discovery period. So I propose to modify paragraph 7F, to give you that full 30 days prior to the November 17 date for completion of fact discovery.

Is that modification acceptable to you, counsel for plaintiffs?

MR. RATNER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you.

Counsel for defendant?

MR. TAUSTER: Your Honor, I just want to note that the reason we went with October 19th rather than the 18th is that October 18th is a Sunday.

THE COURT: Understood.

So let's push it even -- let's leave it as the 18th.

I hope that you'll do it before the 18th --

MR. TAUSTER: Fair enough, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- so that you don't get caught up with that. Thank you, counsel. Good.

So let me say a few words about the case management plan and scheduling order just to inform how it is that you approach the issues raised.

First, you should exchange your HIPAA-complaint medical records releases no later than the date that is specified in the case management plan. Indeed, I would recommend that they be provided sooner than that if possible. As I understand it, based on the proffers by counsel here and the facts alleged in the complaint, plaintiff is putting in issue her medical condition and is arguing that the results of the alleged misconduct have exacerbated previously existing medical conditions. That appears to put at issue her medical history with respect to those issues, but may underscore those claim damages. So I expect that the defendants will want and will seek records releases for the relevant treatment

providers. I direct you to provide those records releases by the date specified in the case management plan. That can be a bottleneck. I've heard from others that that can particularly be a bottleneck in the face of the pandemic, where medical professionals may have other better things to do than providing documents in connection with litigation. So I strongly encourage you to take care of that issue promptly so that it is not a bottleneck. Please focus on that.

The second thing that I want to highlight is that I believe that these deadlines are reasonable and that they provide a sufficient time for the parties to complete discovery. I want to highlight that the deadlines are real deadlines and that they are, as written, deadlines for completion of discovery. So, for example, paragraph 7A says that "all fact discovery shall be completed no later than November 17, 2020." That word, "completed," shows my expectation that discovery will be completed by that date. "Completed" means no more of it after that date. So please keep that general rule in mind as you're conducting discovery. There are a number of corollaries that flow from that general rule. I'm going to highlight two of them right now, but there are others which I'll leave for you to extrapolate on your own.

The first that I want to highlight is that, because this is a real deadline and a deadline for completion of discovery, you should not horde discovery disputes until late

in the discovery period. Instead, if there is a discovery dispute, you should bring it to my attention promptly if you're unable to resolve it so that I can help you resolve it, so that discovery will be completed by the deadline for completion of fact discovery.

If there is a discovery dispute that you sit on until late in the discovery period, such that you cannot get used information during the discovery period, you should not expect that I will compel your adversary or third party to produce the information. That's because my expectation is that you complete discovery by this date. So if you choose to sit on your rights waiting for time to pass, you should expect that I'll hold you to the consequences of that decision. You should not expect that I will extend this deadline to permit to you litigate discovery disputes, because it's not a deadline for litigation about discovery, it's the deadline for completion of discovery.

The second corollary that I want to highlight is simply the fact that these deadlines and meeting them will require that you take into account the fact that they are deadlines that you're scheduling a request for information and depositions. Just to give you a simple example of what I mean: Here, depositions can be completed up through and including October 30th, 2020, and that is fine. Understand, however, that to the extent that you defer a deposition until late in

the discovery period will simply mean that you'll have less time to do followup discovery with respect to any information that you might glean during the depositions or in response to a late-served request for information. So keep that in mind both as you are scheduling requests for information and depositions and as you are choosing how to respond to failures by your adversary to respond timely to previously propounded requests for information. Good.

So the other thing I want to highlight is that while all of these are real deadlines, I think the deadline in paragraph 8(c) are worthy of particular note. That's the paragraph that requires disclosure of expert disclosures as required under Rule 26(a)(2). There are a couple things that I want to highlight about this paragraph:

First, the paragraph requires that you provide all of the required disclosures under Rule 26(a)(2) by the date specified. It is not sufficient for you, for example, to provide merely your expert's name by the date specified here. Instead, you must provide one hundred percent of the disclosures required under the rules by that date. So her name, her report, her list of prior testimony, all of the things required under the rule have to be disclosed. Look at the rule to see what must be disclosed and prepare to provide all of that by the specified date. If you fail to provide all of those disclosures by the relevant date, you should not

expect to hear an expert will be permitted to provide testimony or other evidence in the case.

The second thing I want to highlight about this paragraph is the fact that under the federal rules, there are experts that give reports and there are experts that don't give reports. They are both experts, however. I'm going to refer to them now as report-giving and non-report-giving experts. Somebody like a treating physician may testify without giving a report, but the scope of their testimony is substantially limited in the absence of a report. So if you conclude that an expert need not provide a report, please think carefully about two things: One, remember that the non-report-giving expert still must disclose information under Rule 26(a)(2). If you fail to provide the requisite disclosures for a non-report-giving expert by the date specified in paragraph 8(c), that expert too will, you should expect, not be permitted to provide evidence or testimony in the case.

Second, for any person who is a treating physician or other non-report-giving expert, you should think about what the testimony is that you wish for her to provide well in advance of the disclosure deadline in paragraph 8(c). I suggest that simply because if you fail to provide an expert report for that expert, then her testimony will be limited to that which is permitted in the absence of a report. So please be mindful of that fact as you're deciding whether a report should be

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provided for any given expert witness. Again, if you fail to provide a report, you should expect that her testimony will be limited to that as permitted in the absence of a report. You should not expect that I'll let you fill in the gaps after the fact by providing a late report.

So I'll issue this order. Good. I'll grant extensions of the deadline here, but only for good cause shown. I do scrutinize requests to ensure that there is good cause, so don't expect that I'll grant an extension because the parties agree to one, for example. Similarly, bear in mind that my expectation is that you'll make professional judgments about the amount of resources that you want to invest in this case. So if you choose to spend time on other cases instead of this one, you shouldn't expect that that will give rise to a finding of good cause by the Court. Instead, you may find that I will ask you to live with the consequences of your decision about what you want to focus your energies on. So I'm giving you this resource. If you choose to use it poorly, you should not expect that I will rescue you from that decision by extending the deadlines. I will scrutinize the requests and ensure that there is good cause.

Now, while -- as I'm about to say -- I hope that the parties will work to resolve this case amicably, my expectation is that your efforts to resolve the case amicably will happen in parallel with your efforts to litigate the case in

accordance with the schedule that will be set forth in the case management plan.

Now, there was commentary earlier about remote depositions. My hope is that the parties will confer about that. The rules provide two means for remote depositions: One is for the parties to agree to it. Otherwise, the Court can permit depositions upon motion by a party. Many of my colleagues, you should know, have standing orders that, as a result of the pandemic, basically authorize all depositions to take place remotely by Zoom or whatever the system may be. I have not done that, but I've heard several motions to permit remote depositions. My hope is that the parties will work together to develop a proposal with respect to those. If for any reason, the parties do not agree to remote depositions for any given witness, I invite you to bring it to my attention so that I can, as described in the rule on motion, make a determination regarding whether or not when it's appropriate.

I strongly encourage the parties to talk promptly about ESI-related issues, particularly custodians and search terms that can be an issue. And I encourage you to focus on that at the outset of the discovery process, particularly as you're collecting information that can be collected remotely.

Good. So I'll enter this case management plan with a single modification no later than today or tomorrow. And that will govern the parties' conduct going forward.

I should ask whether or not there's anything that I can do to help the parties resolve the case amicably. Please let me know if there is. I'm happy to do something that could be helpful for you. You know, the Court has two annexed mediation programs and we have four magistrate judges who dedicate a substantial portion of their time to help parties settle cases. We also have a mediation program which is staffed by volunteer mediators with experience in the area. I'd be happy to refer you to either of those resources. It's not clear to me that the parties are ready to engage in that kind of conversation at this point, but it's always beneficial in my view to have an open line of communications about a potential resolution of the case.

Let me know, counsel, if you would, if you think it would be helpful for me to refer you to either of those options now. If not now, please be aware that I'm happy to make them available to you in the future if your assessment changes. Let me turn first to counsel for plaintiffs.

Counsel, is there anything I can do at this time to help the parties resolve the case?

MR. RATNER: Well, your Honor, I think what you said kind of applies to this case and as we see it now, and that is that we're pretty far apart. And I'm hoping that the discovery will narrow this gap on one side or another. And, you know, I've had opportunities to settle cases with the help of a

myriad of magistrate judges in this district. And so if the opportunity comes in this case, I will not hesitate to seek a referral, your Honor.

We're not -- I mean, it does say in the order we're not against private mediation, but that's a cost that will be incurred. So I'm happy to share that. And, you know, that the Court provides a mediation program and it still is working, you know -- but my preference first would be to try to get it over to a magistrate judge, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine. Please let me know in the future if you think it would be helpful. Yes, our mediation program is still working. I'm informed that it is still vibrant. Good. I think that's all that I wanted to take up here.

Anything else that we need to discuss before we adjourn, first, counsel for plaintiffs?

MR. RATNER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Counsel for defendant?

MR. TAUSTER: Your Honor, this is David Tauster.

Nothing further from defendants. Thank you very much for your time and attention today.

THE COURT: Thank you. My pleasure.

I think there's one thing that I'm going to mention, although I don't think I need to. But it's occurred to me, so

I may as well.

I'm presiding over another case also involving State
Street. It does not involve claims of discrimination. It's a
trademark case involving The Fearless Girl statute. It has, as
far as I can tell, no impact. I see no basis to recuse myself
or anything as a result. But I thought that the parties might
be interested in knowing that fact, so I am letting you know
that fact.

MR. RATNER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you, all.

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